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THE DE INTELLECTU 
REVISITED 
Frederic M. Schroeder 
Queen’s University, Kingston 
Robert B. Todd 
University of British Columbia 
RÉSUMÉ : L’auteur du De Intellectu connaît le De Anima d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et il offre une 
interprétation néoplatonicienne de ce texte dans sa considération de la doctrine noétique 
d’Aristote du De Anima 3.5. Cette interprétation révèle précisément cette autonomie philoso-
phique par opposition à un examen purement philologique des textes aristotéliciens que le pré-
sent volume explore. Le De Intellectu, en raison de son caractère néoplatonicien, doit dater de 
quelque deux à quatre siècles après Alexandre. Il ne contient aucune référence à un Aristote de 
Mytilène, maître d’Alexandre, contrairement à ce qui a été suggéré. 
ABSTRACT : The author of the De Intellectu is acquainted with the De Anima of Alexander of Aph-
rodisias and offers a Neoplatonic interpretation of that document in its consideration of the 
noetic doctrine at Aristotle, De Anima 3.5. That interpretation reveals that philosophical inde-
pendence from a purely philological examination of Aristotelian texts which the present vol-
ume is exploring. The De Intellectu, because of its Neoplatonic character, is to be dated some 
two to four centuries after Alexander. There is no reference to an Aristotle of Mytilene, teacher 
of Alexander, as has been supposed. 
______________________  
INTRODUCTION 
t is the purpose of the present volume to explore how commentators on Aristotle 
reveal their philosophical independence from a purely philological examination of 
Aristotelian texts by virtue of their exegetical style, practice, and method. We offer 
this paper as an examination of that very independence as it is shown forth in the re-
ception and interpretation of the analogy of light in Aristotle De Anima 3.5 in two 
texts, the De Anima (henceforth DA) of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the De Intel-
lectu (henceforth DI), a work which, while dependent upon the former treatise, modi-
fies its doctrine with reference to Neoplatonic noetic. 
I 
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I. EXEGETICAL STYLE IN THE DE INTELLECTU 
Schroeder argues that the DI exhibits the influence of Plotinus.1 Because Por-
phyry in the Vita Plotini 14 tells us that Alexander (sc. of Aphrodisias) was read in 
Plotinus’ seminar, scholars have sought the influence of Alexander, particularly the 
noetic doctrine of the DA, on Plotinus. Sometimes they seek the influence indiscrimi-
nately of the DA and the DI in that author. Obviously if there is a question about the 
Alexandrian authorship of the DI, it is unjustifiable to seek the influence of that work 
upon Plotinus. Still, there are remarkable similarities between the DI and Plotinus. 
We are persuaded that the influence runs in the other direction, i.e., that Plotinus in-
fluences the DI. The first example of an author influenced by Alexander who also 
consults Plotinus is Themistius in the fourth century.2 Thus, if the DI betrays the 
influence of Plotinus, the provenance of that work should be assigned to a period 
much later than that of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
Schroeder discusses Alexander, DA 42.19-43.11 where Alexander treats of the 
genesis of natural illumination. He there argues that illumination is to be explained as 
a qualitative change (kinêsis) induced according to the relation or juxtaposition (sche-
sis) of the source of light and the illumined object and that illumination is a joint ef-
fect of both the source of illumination and the illumined object.3 
Accattino and Donini object to Schroeder’s taking both the sources of colour and 
light and the coloured or illumined objects as the referents of “change (kinêsis) from 
both” (ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων κίνησις) at DA 43.2. They insist that the referent should be the 
immediately preceding “the sources which colour [light] […] that which illumines” 
τὰ χρωννύντα […] τὸ φωτίζον (42.23-43.1).4 Even if we adopt their view of the 
proper referents of “change (kinêsis) from both” (ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων κίνησις), we still 
find that change kinêsis is described as “in accordance with presence and the character 
of their relation (κατὰ παρουσίαν τε καὶ ποιὰν σχέσιν) (43.2-3).” Here presence is 
interpreted with respect to relation, not vice versa. Therefore the source of light is not 
the sole cause of illumination : Both the source of light and the illumined object are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of illumination. Yet the referents 
suggested by AD Bruns properly contains in a parenthesis. It is preferable to look be-
fore the parenthetical statement in which they are contained to the distinction at the 
beginning of the sentence between the source of light and colour and the diaphanous. 
                                       
 1. Cf. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias,” Do-
cumenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 8 (1997), p. 105-120. 
 2. Cf. F.M. SCHROEDER and R.B. TODD, Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, Toronto, 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990 (henceforth ST), p. 34, n. 115 and further references there 
cited ; R.B. TODD, trans., Themistius and Aristotle On the Soul, London, Duckworth, 1996, p. 244. 
 3. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of Aphro-
disias,” Hermes, 109 (1981), p. 215-225. 
 4. P. ACCATTINO, P.L. DONINI, Alessandro di Afrodisia : L’Anima, Rome, Bari, Laterza, 1996 (henceforth 
AD), p. 182-183. 
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AD also argue against Schroeder’s view that kinêsis is to be viewed as a qualita-
tive change in the potentially transparent.5 They show that Alexander In De Sensu 
131.20-134.19 denies that illumination is kinêsis in the sense of alteration. Alexander 
says (132.2-6) : 
For air and the diaphanous are not illumined through change (kinêsis), but all at once the 
diaphanous and the illumined come about from that which is potentially diaphanous and 
illumined, passing from a state of not having to a condition of having, not through re-
ceiving and being affected (kineisthai). For it is by relation and presence (σχέσει γὰρ καὶ 
παρουσίᾳ) of the source of light toward that which is by nature to be illumined that light 
is brought about. 
The genesis of illumination through this relation is contrasted with the causation of 
sound and scent which required a transition (diadosis) and change (kinêsis) that takes 
place in time (132.14-15). It is to be noticed that the kinêsis that is rejected here is an 
alteration communicated over time through a medium (sc. air). In Alexander, 
DA 43.1-2, illumination arises through τις… κίνησις, “a kind of kinêsis.” The func-
tion of the indefinite pronoun here is doubtless to dissociate the change involved from 
that kinêsis that we find in the case of sound and scent. Alexander says (DI 43.10-
11) : “For it is by relation of the source which is capable of illumining and those 
things that are capable of being illumined that light is. For light is not a body.” The 
incorporeal nature of light forbids that light be transmitted through a corporeal me-
dium over time. Here we can see Alexander’s understanding that light is not an ema-
nation from a source of light (42.20-21). 
AD also advance another text, which, since it exhibits strong similarities to the 
In De Sensu, may be thought to reflect the genuine position of Alexander : The trea-
tise in the Mantissa entitled “How seeing comes about according to Aristotle” (143.4-
18).6 The author asserts that sight does not require a change (tropê) that comes about 
in air and the illumined object such as occurs in objects that are altered (alloioume-
nois). The author denies that illumination consists in an alteration (alloiôsis) defined 
as a change (kinêsis) that comes about in time and involves transition (kata metabo-
lên). Illumination comes about by the presence (parousia) of the luminous source and 
its relation with or juxtaposition (schesis) with the illumined object. This relationship 
is compared with that between something which is on the right of something else. 
When the object to the right is removed, there is no change in the object with respect 
to which it is now relocated. This illustration might lead us to think that illumination 
simply is a relation, so that a change in that relation need not affect the object or 
objects with respect to which the relation comes about or is changed. This compari-
son leads Sharples to believe that illumination is a “Cambridge change.”7 
The author of “How seeing comes about according to Aristotle” argues that the 
greatest proof that the diaphanous is not subject to change or alteration is that such 
                                       
 5. Ibid., p. 181-182. 
 6. Ibid., p. 181. 
 7. R.W. SHARPLES, trans., Alexander of Aphrodisias. Supplement to “On the Soul,” Ithaca, New York, Cor-
nell University Press, 2004, p. 127. 
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change or alteration takes place in time, whereas illumination is not subject to tempo-
ral duration (143.23-28, trans. Sharples) : 
[The following] is the greatest sign that what comes about is neither an alteration nor a 
change (μήτε ἀλλοίωσιν μήτε κίνησιν) of the transparent : everything that changes (πᾶν 
γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον) does so in time and proceeds first in a shorter time to what is closer, 
next and in a greater [time] in this way to what is further. But light and the forms of the 
things that are seen come to be altogether and in a similar way in all the transparent over 
against them, as also do shadow and darkness. 
We have seen how it is that, in the In De Sensu, sound and scent involve a com-
munication of change over a distance and in time. Doubtless in the present text it is 
the same kind of corporeal change that is denied to illumination, as in the In De Sen-
su. It is doubtful that the author simply means that light is a relation.8 He is rather 
saying that illumination occurs under the conditions of juxtaposition. At DA 43.1-3 
Alexander speaks of a “certain change […] according to presence and a kind of rela-
tion” (τις […] κίνησις […] κατὰ παρουσίαν τε καὶ ποιὰν σχέσιν). It is change in 
accordance with a relationship. Similarly in “How seeing comes about according to 
Aristotle” we read (143.18) that the apparent alteration of the diaphanous occurs 
κατὰ σχέσιν. In De Sensu 31.11 : κατὰ σχέσιν ; In De Sensu 42.27-43.1 : ἀλλὰ 
κατὰ σχέσιν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ποιὰν φωτίζειν πεφυκότος ποτὲ μὲν πεφώτισται, ποτὲ 
δ’ οὐ; (here we have as in DA 43.3 ποιὰν σχέσιν) ; In De Sensu 133.24-25 : ἐν τῇ 
τοιᾷδε σχέσει τοῦ φωτίζοντος πρὸς αὐτό. 
Alexander then avoids that language of change that would induce us to think that 
illumination is temporal and conveyed by means of a material medium. He explains 
the relationship (schesis) necessary to the generation of illumination with examples of 
relationships that avoid internal change. Yet it is improbable that Alexander thinks 
that illumination is a relationship and that it is a “Cambridge change.” We may think 
of our present understanding of magnetism. Magnetism comes about when a negative 
and a positive pole are juxtaposed : Yet we do not say that magnetism is that juxtapo-
sition. 
It is significant that Alexander at DA 43.3 uses mirrors as an example of illumi-
nation which involves juxtaposition. The word κάτοπτρον can refer to any reflective 
surface, not just the artifact.9 Now the mirror or reflective surface is not changed qua 
bronze, water, etc. by the fact of illumination. Yet it is changed or altered qua reflec-
tive surface, reflecting now one thing, and then another. We hope that this interpreta-
tion has been justified by the argument above. By a parity of reasoning, a diaphanous 
object is affected qua diaphanous by its manifestation of light or colour (e.g., being 
now one colour and then another) without there being any change in its material sub-
                                       
 8. At In De Sensu 31.16-18, Alexander says : “It is clear that light is a relation, and is dependent upon a rela-
tion (ὅτι δὲ σχέσις τις καὶ κατὰ σχέσιν) between the illuminant and the illumined, and is not substance 
and body, from the fact that <light> does not persist even for a little while when the illuminant has been 
turned away” (trans. Towey). Towey does not translate the τις. It is a “sort of” relation and what sort it is is 
defined by the words “dependent upon a relation.” 
 9. Cf. F.M. SCHROEDER, “Representation and Reflection in Plotinus,” Dionysius, 4 (1980), p. 55, n. 58. 
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strate. Again, there is no necessity to think that illumination (or reflection) is the re-
lation between the source of light and the illumined object. 
Schroeder is concerned to argue that illumination is a joint effect of the source of 
light and the illumined object. As long as we understand that the kinêsis that comes 
about is not in time and not conveyed through a material medium, we may still see it 
as (in some undefined sense appropriate to illumination) a kind of qualitative change 
that requires both the source of illumination and the illumined object. AD further take 
Schroeder to task for applying the pattern of joint causation to the analogy of the 
Active Intellect to light (DA 88.26-89.6) in such a way that the intelligibles, once ab-
stracted by the human mind from their material substrate, make their own contribu-
tion to intelligibility.10 They argue that Schroeder, having misunderstood the relation-
ship between the source of light and the illumined object at DA 42.19-43.11, may not 
apply his understanding of that relationship to the Active Intellect and intelligibility. 
Yet surely that interpretation is justified. 
Plotinus polemicizes against Alexander’s understanding of illumination as a joint 
effect of the source of light and the illumined object. Rather illumination is the effect 
solely of the source of light which is both the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the existence of illumination. At 4.5.7.33-49 Plotinus, taking issue with Alexander, 
DA 42.19-43.11, stresses that sensible illumination is uniquely an effect of the 
source.11 This difference on the question of sensible illumination reappears as both 
authors draw the analogy of light. As we have seen, Alexander in the DA sees intelli-
gibility as a joint effect in accordance with the juxtaposition of the Active Intellect 
and the intelligible objects even as illumination is a joint effect of the juxtaposition of 
the source of illumination and the illumined object. For Plotinus, the supreme hypos-
tasis, the One, is the unique source of noetic illumination for the hypostasis of Intel-
lect (5.1.6.27-34).12 
To return to the DI, the intellect from without is there said to confer intellect in 
the state of possession (the hexis) on the material intellect (107.29-34 ; 111.29-32). 
This view appears to contradict the view of Alexander, DA that intellect in the state 
of possession is reached by the human intellect in the natural course of its evolution.13 
At the same time the human intellect does, according to the DI, of itself advance to 
the abstraction of intelligible forms from matter and the hexis. Its role is not, as the 
role of the eye in vision, passive : It was already intellect before it entered into act 
and the act of intellection belongs to itself. Yet it is said to be augmented and per-
                                       
 10. AD, p. 290. 
 11. F.M. SCHROEDER, “Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus,” Hermes, 112 (1984), p. 242-
244 ; cf. ID., Form and Transformation. A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Montreal, Kingston, Lon-
don, Buffalo, McGill-Queen’s Press, 1992, p. 25-28. 
 12. Cf. 6.7.16.30-31. F.M. SCHROEDER, “Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus,” p. 245-
246 ; ST, p. 16. 
 13. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias” ; ID., “The Potential or Material Intellect and the Authorship of the De Intellectu : A Reply to 
B.C. Bazán,” Symbolae Osloenses, 57 (1982), p. 114-125 ; ST, p. 11-13. 
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fected by the intellect from without (111.29-112.5 ; cf. 110.31-111.5).14 So how do 
we reconcile the role of the intellect from without in producing the hexis and the ap-
parent autonomy of the human intellect ? 
Accattino accuses Schroeder of confusing the development and the completion of 
the potential intellect, which culminates in the thought of that which is by its own 
nature intelligible, with the perfection which that object of thought confers on the 
intellective faculty.15 There is no confusion here. The Active Intellect, as that object 
which is by its own nature intelligible, is present to the potential intellect from the 
first. As such, i.e., as the primary object of intellective vision, it enables the potential 
intellect to develop to the hexis and ultimately to its direct knowledge of the Active 
Intellect. As such it both progressively perfects the potential intellect as it develops 
and crowns that process with the ultimate perfection in which the human intellect 
achieves direct knowledge of the Active Intellect in its role as that which is by its 
own nature intelligible. 
Now Accattino also agrees with Schroeder that the apprehension of the object of 
intellection that is intelligible by its own nature and the apprehension of that which is 
intelligible by its own nature (the intellect from without) is simultaneous.16 In the 
analogy of light, we behold the light and the objects that it illumines simultaneously. 
Even so we behold the potential intelligibles and the intellect from without simulta-
neously. 
The DI offers the following analogy of the intellect from without to light (B.2 
111.27-36) : 
That which is intellect by nature and from without becomes co-operative with the intellect 
that is in us, since the other objects of thought would not even exist in potentiality unless 
there were an object of thought existing in its own nature [i.e., independently]. Since it is 
indeed an object of thought in its own nature when through being thought it has come to 
exist as intellect in the thinker and is thought from without, it is immortal and instills in 
the material intellect the state of possession (ἐντίθησιν τὴν ἕξιν) that results in its think-
ing the potential objects of thought. For just as light, being productive of actual vision, is 
itself seen along with its concomitants [sc. illumined things] (καὶ αὐτὸ ὁρᾶται καὶ τὰ σὺν 
αὐτῷ) and it is through it that colour [is visible], so also the intellect from without be-
comes the cause of thinking for us, when it is itself thought [by us], not by producing in-
tellect itself, but by, through its own nature, completing the intellect that exists and 
bringing it to its proper [activities].17 
In the article in question, Schroeder nowhere denies that the human intellect autono-
mously abstracts intelligible form from matter and progresses to the preservation and 
knowledge of form. It is rather that the intellect from without is present to the human 
                                       
 14. Cf. the discussion of the independent character of the human intellect in P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di 
Afrodisia, De Intellectu, Introduzione, traduzione e commento di Paolo Accottino, Thélème, Turin, 2001, 
p. 11. 
 15. Ibid., p. 51 ; cf. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphro-
disias”. 
 16. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 51-52. 
 17. Trans. ST, p. 54-55. 
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mind, as a source of intellectual illumination, which enables the human intellect in its 
progress from the first. The human mind beholds the intellect from without at first 
and is illumined and enabled by it. 
Sharples observes concerning that light that is seen together with its concomi-
tants : “Alan Lacey points out to me that it is the source of light that is seen, rather 
than the light that it produces.”18 Lacey is correct in this interpretation. In this we 
may see the difference between the use of the analogy of light in the DA and the DI. 
In the DI the intellect from without (or Active Intellect) is constantly present to the 
human intellect as an object of vision from the first. It is that primary vision of the 
Active Intellect that enables the human intellect to abstract, conserve, and know form. 
In the DA, by contrast, the vision of the Active Intellect consummates a noetic pil-
grimage on the part of the human intellect. 
Accattino establishes two stages : (1) the development of the human intellect ; 
(2) its perfection and illumination by the intellect from without.19 On our interpreta-
tion there are not two stages. That simultaneity that Schroeder notices (and Accattino 
accepts) demonstrates that the intellect from without is active throughout the process 
of development. As Schroeder comments : 
Now when we see visible objects, we see at the same time the light by which they are il-
luminated. The vision of light and of the visibles may then be distinguished as two aspects 
of a single event, without implying the temporal priority of either. Thus the Intellect from 
without qua object of thought remains an abiding and illuminating presence throughout 
the increase and completion of the human intellect.20 
This intellectual illumination contrasts with that which we find in Alexander, DA. In 
the DA the human mind progresses in a natural evolution from the potential intellect, 
to the intellect in a state of possession, to the intellect in act. It is at that final stage 
that the natural and metaphysical orders meet in a moment of illumination as the 
natural intelligibles are put into that juxtaposition with the Active Intellect which al-
lows intellectual illumination. In the DI, on the other hand, the human intellect is al-
ways illumined by the light of the intellect from without throughout its progress. 
Schroeder compares the passage 111.27-36 with Plotinus 5.5.7.2-8 where Plot-
inus tells us how the human eye sees by means of light : 
One thing is an object of vision for it, the form of the sensible object, another is that by 
means of which [i.e., the light] it sees the form of it [the sensible object], which [medium] 
is also an object of sensation for it, while being other than the form [of the sensible object] 
and the cause of the form of being seen and is concomitantly seen (συνορώμενον) both in 
the form and upon the form ; for this reason it [the light] does not yield a clear sensation 
of itself, because the eye is turned toward the illuminated object ; but whenever it [i.e., the 
light] is nothing but itself, it sees it in an immediate intuition. 
                                       
 18. R.W. SHARPLES, trans., Alexander of Aphrodisias. Supplement to “On the Soul,” p. 37, n. 87. 
 19. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 51-52. 
 20. ST, p. 72 ; F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Potential or Material Intellect and the Authorship of the De Intellectu : 
A Reply to B.C. Bazán,” p. 112. 
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Plotinus continues to show how this understanding of sensible illumination applies to 
the illumination of the hypostasis of Intellect by the One (16-21) : 
This then is what the seeing Intellect is like ; this also sees by another light the things il-
luminated by that first nature [i.e., the One or Good as the sun of the intelligible universe], 
and sees the light in them ; when it turns its attention to the nature of the things illumi-
nated, it sees the light less, but if it abandons the things it sees and looks at the medium by 
which it sees them, it looks at a pure light and the source of light. 
We may notice the parallel between 5.5.7.5-6 “concomitantly seen” (συνορώμενον) 
and DI 111.33 : “is itself seen along with [its concomitants]” (ὁρᾶται… σὺν). We have 
seen that Plotinus polemicizes against Alexander, DA in his use of the analogy of the 
Active Intellect to light (in which the Plotinian One plays a role similar to that of the 
Active Intellect in Alexander) : The source is for Plotinus uniquely the cause of illu-
mination, which is not produced, as in Alexander, DA, in the juxtaposition of the 
source and the illumined object. The intellect from without in the DI is the abiding 
presence which is the unique source of illumination to the human intellect which 
could not progress without that illumination from the first. That source is always seen 
together with the intelligible objects that it illumines. Yet the human intellect is not 
immediately aware of it. In the Plotinian passage the One as unique source of il-
lumination is always present to Intellect, but that presence is not thematized in its ha-
bitual act of intellection. 
The relationship between the One and Intellect in Plotinus is adapted by the au-
thor of the DI to the relationship between the intellect from without (or Active Intel-
lect) to the human intellect. As the One illumines the Intellect and makes possible its 
acts of intellection, so does the intellect from without illumine the human intellect 
and make possible its intellective acts. We have seen that in the DI the intellect from 
without imparts the hexis of intellection (107.33-34 : ἕξιν ἐμποιῶν τὴν νοητικήν ; 
111.31 : ἐντίθησιν τὴν ἕξιν). At a lower noetic level Plotinus speaks of the human 
intellect in its own characteristic act of intellect as “that state [hexis] of the soul 
which is one of the things that derive from Intellect” (ἥν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὖσαν τῶν 
παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ).21 Here the human soul derives the hexis from Intellect : We may 
compare the way in which the intellect from without instills the hexis in the human 
intellect in the DI. The human intellect in Plotinus does not progress of itself to in-
tellection, but derives intellection from the hypostasis of Intellect. Similarly in the DI 
the human intellect, while it progresses through stages to intellection, derives all of its 
progress from its primal vision of the Active Intellect which may be seen as corre-
sponding to Intellect in Plotinus. The derivation of intellection on the part of the hu-
man intellect from Intellect rehearses the timeless derivation of intellection on the 
part of Intellect from its vision of the One. 
Where Plotinus polemicizes against the analogy of light drawn in Alexander’s 
DA, the DI is pursuing mutatis mutandis a scheme of intellectual illumination very 
like that of Plotinus. It is reasonable to think that the DI, often indiscriminately used 
                                       
 21. Cf. Plotinus 1.1.8.2 ; and F.M. SCHROEDER, “Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus,” 
p. 248. 
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by scholars along with the DA as a source for Plotinus, is in this instance using Plot-
inus himself as a source. 
Accattino urges against Schroeder’s Plotinian interpretation that the simultaneous 
character of the vision of light and of the illumined objects is to be found in authentic 
works of Alexander. 22  Accattino cites the In De Sensu 135.11-13 and compares 
DA 42.19-43.11. Both passages speak of the juxtaposition of the luminous source and 
the illumined object. In the De Sensu the discussion of the perception of light is pre-
ceded, as we have seen, by a contrast between the production of scent and the pro-
duction of vision. In the case of scent, there is a cause that arouses scent which is 
communicated through a medium (air) over a period of time. In the case of light, the 
production of light is atemporal and it arises, not from a source that exercises an ef-
fect over an intervening medium, but in the juxtaposition of the source of light and 
the illumined objects. Thus vision is also atemporal. Perhaps the light is thus seen at 
the same time as the illumined objects, but this point is not brought out directly in the 
text. 
Accattino then also cites Alexander, DA 42.19-43.11 for the same simultaneity. It 
is very difficult to find such a doctrine in the latter passage. Alexander does say that 
when one withdraws the illumined object, illumination ceases, as also, when one 
withdraws the source of illumination, the illumination comes to an end : Alexander is 
arguing for illumination as a joint effect of source of light and illumined object, as we 
have seen. Perhaps this statement implies that the source of light and the illumined 
objects are seen concomitantly, but this idea would be there only by implication. 
What is more, this passage is about the genesis of natural illumination and does not 
occur in the context of the analogy of the Active Intellect to light. Therefore one asks 
after its relevance. In any case, as we have seen, the production of illumination by 
juxtaposition stands in direct conflict with the monistic view of illumination, both 
sensible and intelligible, in the DI. 
At 111.34-36, the intellect from without, there compared with light, is said to be-
come “the cause of thinking for us, when it is itself thought [by us], not by producing 
intellect itself, but by, through its own nature, completing (τελείων) the intellect that 
exists and bring it to its proper activities.”23 The potential intellect produces objects 
of thought by being completed (τελειούμενος ; τελειωθείς, 112.2-3) by the intellect 
from without. Schroeder argues that this use of “complete” (τελειῶν) reflects Plot-
inus 5.1.7.16-17, i.e., in the Plotinian chapter we discuss above in the context of our 
discussion of illumination in the DI and Plotinus, where Plotinus says that the hy-
postasis of Intellect “is perfected (τελειοῦται) by it [the One] and from it unto sub-
stantial existence.”24 
                                       
 22. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 51-52. 
 23. Trans. ST, p. 55. 
 24. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Potential or Material Intellect and the Authorship of the De Intellectu : A Reply to 
B.C. Bazán,” p. 116 ; at p. 116, n. 36, Schroeder also compares Plotinus 3.8.11.15-17 and 5.4.2.4-5 (with 
Henry and Schwyzer construing νοητὸν as the One and with Volkmann reading ἀποτελειουμένη [line 51]). 
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Accattino objects that in Alexander, DA 43.5-8 (this is the passage discussed 
above as illustrating Alexander’s theory of illumination), Alexander says : “When 
there is something which through them [the illuminata] is capable of being transparent 
and this in act, then they are eminently and in act transparent when they receive their 
perfection (τελειότητα) and their native form qua transparent from the light. For light 
is the act and completion (τελειότης) of the transparent qua transparent.”25 Accattino 
admits the lack of precise verbal parallels, but insists that the idea expressed is the 
same. He observes, however, that the uses of the verb “complete” (τελειοῦν) in the 
passage from the DI occur in the context of the analogy of light. He says that it 
should not surprise us that, after having introduced the parallel between light and the 
intellect from without, Alexander can say that the latter perfects the potential intel-
lect. 
In DA 43.5-8, which concerns illumination as such (i.e., not light as the term of 
an analogy), the illuminata receive their perfection from the light. At 111.34-36, 
which by contrast undertakes an analogical use of illumination, it is the potential 
intellect that receives its perfection from the intellect from without (compared with 
the light that actualizes vision). It is difficult to determine the relevance of Accat-
tino’s comparison. 
II. AUTHORSHIP, PROSOPOGRAPHY, AND UNITY 
OF THE DE INTELLECTU 
Now that we have clarified that the DI is to be regarded as a late and Neopla-
tonizing work which views the doctrine of Alexander’s DA through the lens of 
Plotinian noetic, we must also conclude that the DI is not a work from the hand of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. A major reason that scholarship has been prevented from 
evaluating the true character and provenance of the DI is attachment to a prosopog-
raphical identification of the “Aristotle” referred to in DI 110.4 with an Aristotle of 
Mytilene who is then thought to be the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This 
prosopographical claim has been previously examined in Schroeder’s work (“The 
Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of Aphrodi-
sias,” 1981 ; “Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus,” 1984 ; “The 
Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias”, 1997) and 
in ST. We wish now to defend this previously expressed skepticism in the light of 
contemporary scholarship. We shall see that the identification is groundless. Since it 
cannot be established, there is no reason why that identification would quarrel with 
the conclusions concerning authorship, date, and provenance set forth in the first part 
of this paper. 
We may first turn to a question of prosopography. At De Intellectu 110.4 we 
read : “And I heard <views> concerning the intellect from without from Aristotle and 
I have preserved them for myself” (Ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ † 
                                       
 25. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 50-52. 
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Ἀριστοτέλους, ἃ διεσωσάμην).26 Suppose that we construe “I heard” (ἤκουσα) with 
“from Aristotle” (παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους). The verb “hear” (ἀκούειν) with the preposi-
tion “from” (παρὰ) governing the genitive case refers, in all of its attestations, to oral 
instruction. Now if the “Aristotle” of this sentence is the Stagirite, then we are pre-
sented with a baffling crux. Since the text is clearly to be dated well after the Stagir-
ite, there cannot be reference here to contemporary oral instruction. 
Zeller emended the text to read “from Aristocles” (Ἀριστοκλέους), so that it 
would refer, not to the Stagirite, but to Aristocles of Messene who was a contempo-
rary of Alexander.27 On this basis, Trabucco gave us a whole new chapter in the his-
tory of ancient philosophy concerning Aristocles. Yet there is no doctrinal agreement 
between the preserved texts of Aristocles and the De Intellectu. 28  Subsequently 
Moraux found in Galen a reference to one Aristotle of Mytilene as an important Ar-
istotelian philosopher.29 On this basis he retained the reading of the MSS., but took 
the reference to be to this Aristotle of Mytilene. He then found a reference in Alexan-
der’s commentary on the Metaphysics to an “our Aristotle” (ἡμέτερος Ἀριστοτέλης) 
whom he further identified with Aristotle of Mytilene.30 On this basis, Moraux, in his 
large study of Greek Aristotelianism, provides a chapter on the noetic of Aristotle of 
Mytilene based on the De Intellectu.31 Accattino, independently of Moraux, also de-
tected a reference to an “Aristotle,” contemporary teacher of Alexander, in the same 
text.32 
ST find titles of works in the De Anima Mantissa (the collection of texts in which 
the De Intellectu is to be found) that invite comparison with the passage at hand : 
(1) Τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου (“[Selections] from Aris-
totle concerning what is first endeared to us”), 150.119. 
                                       
 26. Bruns seems to have supplied the obelus out of deference to Zeller. 
 27. E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt, vol. 3.1., 
5th ed., rev. W. Nestle, Leipzig, Reisland, 1923, 814n1 ; 815n3. 
 28. F. TRABUCCO, “Il problema di ‘de philosophia’ di Aristocle di Messene e la sua dottrina,” Acme, 11 (1987), 
p. 87-150 ; cf. M.L. CHIESARA, Aristotle of Mytilene. Testimonia and Fragments, ed. with translation and 
commentary by M.L. Chiesara, Oxford, Oxford University Press (coll. “Oxford Classical Monographs”), 
2001, p. XVI : “[…] nor, as now scholars generally agree, is there need to introduce Aristocles of Messene 
into Alexander’s text, also because, once the other pieces of evidence attributed to Aristotle of Mytilene 
are examined, there will appear no doctrinal reason to connect either the doctrine of 110-11 or that of 112-
13 with him.” 
 29. GALEN, De Consuetudinibus (Peri Ethôn), ed. I. MÜLLER (Galeni Scripta Minora, vol. 2 [Leipzig, Teub-
ner, 1891], 11.4-5) ; “Ein neues Zeugnis über Aristoteles den Lehrer von Alexanders von Aphrodisias,” 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 67 (1985), p. 266-269. 
 30. ALEXANDER, In Metaphysica 166.19-20 ; and P. MORAUX, “Ein neues Zeugnis über Aristoteles den Lehrer 
von Alexanders von Aphrodisias.” 
 31. P. MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 2, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1984, p. 399-425. For 
a more detailed history of this problem, see ST, p. 22-31. 
 32. P. ACCATTINO, “Alessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di Mitilene,” Elenchos, 6 (1985), p. 67-74. Wil-
liam E. DOOLEY and Arthur MADIGAN, trans., Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Metaphysics 2 and 3, 
London, Duckworth, 1992, p. 56, n. 3 review the literature and accept the identification of “our Aristotle” 
with Aristotle of Mytilene, but advance no fresh argument. 
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(2) Τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (“[Selections] from Aristotle 
concerning what is in our power”), 169.33 and 172.16. 
In these examples the phrase τὰ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους means “the views derived from 
Aristotle.” On the basis of these parallels, we venture an emendation at 110.4 : 
Ἤκουσα δὲ <τὰ> περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ Ἀριστελοῦς ἃ διεσωσάμην (“I heard 
<the> [views] on the intellect from without [derived from] Aristotle).”33 This emenda-
tion severs the link between “hears” (ἀκούειν) and the genitive so that there is no 
necessary reference to oral instruction. It also allows us to understand by “Aristotle” 
the Stagirite. If this emendation is adopted, there is no need to identify the “Aristotle” 
of the passage with Aristotle of Mytilene (or any other homonymous “Aristotle”). 
Opsomer and Sharples argue that there is no necessity for the emendation ad-
vanced by ST. They construe “hear from Aristotle” (ἀκούειν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους) 
with “about the intellect from without” (περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν). Thus we may under-
stand the text to mean : “I also heard, about the intellect from without from Aristotle, 
[things] which I preserved.”34 Again the link between ἀκούειν and παρὰ and the 
genitive is severed, so that we may continue to understand that the “Aristotle” of the 
text is the Stagirite. In so doing, they revert to something very like the position that 
Moraux originally adopted before he engaged in his prosopographical enquiries : 
“J’ai eu connaissance d’une théorie d’Aristote sur l’intellect extérieur, et je l’ai con-
servée fidèlement.”35 Opsomer and Sharples properly argue that if we construe “hear” 
(ἀκούειν) with “from Aristotle” (παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους) then the author shall in the 
third person be explaining to Aristotle what his own motives are for introducing his 
views on the intellect from without.36 
Accattino sees two possibilities, each with its own problems : (1) The “Aristotle” 
of 110.4 and 110.5 is the same person. Yet, if this is the case, why does the author 
introduce the name “Aristotle” a second time one line after its first mention and not 
use a pronoun as in 110.25 to refer to the Aristotle concerned ? (At 110.5 we hear 
about the concerns that motivated Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without 
(τὰ… κινήσαντα Ἀριστοτέλη εἰσαγαγεῖν τὸν θύραθεν νοῦν) and at 110.24-25 we 
have “these are the concerns that motivated him” (ταῦτα… τὰ κινήσαντα ἐκεῖνον) ; 
(2) The “Aristotle” of 110.4 and the “Aristotle” of 110.5 are different persons. Yet it 
must strike us as strange that the author has not given us some indication of the dif-
ference in person other than the simple repetition of the name. The view that those 
                                       
 33. Cf. the full argument at ST, p. 28-29. 
 34. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4 : ‘I heard this from Aristotle’. 
A modest proposal,” Classical Quarterly, 50 (2000), p. 255. 
 35. P. MORAUX, Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Exégète de la noétique d’Aristote, Liège, Paris, E. Droz, 1942, 
p. 148, 189. We may also compare Moraux’s paraphrase, in a private communication from 1961 : “Au su-
jet de la théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect venu du dehors, j’ai entendu proposées les explications que 
j’ai tenu à conserver” (in B. CARRIÈRE et al., Le PERI NOU attribué à Alexandre d’Aphrodise, with trans-
lation, introduction and notes. Dissertation Montreal, 1961, p. 27, n. 22. See ST, p. 29). 
 36. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 255. 
THE DE INTELLECTU REVISITED 
675 
who do not take the “Aristotle” of 110.4 to be a teacher of Alexander cannot explain 
the repetition of “Aristotle” at 110.5 is the major axis of Accattino’s argument.37 
There are, however, other explanations of why the “Aristotle” of 110.4 is reprised 
at 110.5. The first “Aristotle” occurs in a statement of tradition, a tradition derived 
from Aristotle. The second Aristotle is Aristotle as interpreted by that tradition. So 
the first Aristotle is indeed the Stagirite, viewed as standing at the head of a tradition. 
The second Aristotle is that Aristotle as understood by that tradition that the author of 
the DI is relating. In the interpretation of ST : “I heard (or read) the things in a tradi-
tion derived from Aristotle concerning the intellect from without which things I have 
carefully preserved. That tradition holds that what moved Aristotle to introduce the 
intellect from without were the following things.”38 
Opsomer and Sharples are concerned lest the ST emendation at 110.4 be thought 
to provide a title, so that the object of “I heard” would be a work entitled : “The 
Views on the Intellect from Without Derived from Aristotle.” They argue that the 
particle γὰρ at 110.5 refers back to “which I have preserved” and explains why the 
views preserved were worth preserving. In the case of other uses of the particle fol-
lowing a title in Alexander, the particle shows “a logical connection between the 
sentence following the title and a controversy already indicated in the title.”39 That is 
not the case here. They also point out that the other titles observe a different order : 
“The Views derived from Aristotle on x,” whereas here the phrase “on the intellect 
from without” precedes the phrase “from Aristotle.” Also the other titles refer to 
Stoic doctrine, 150.119 to “what is first endeared to us” (περί τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου) 
and 169.33 and 172.16 to “what is in our power” (περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). The function of 
the prepositional phrase παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους (“from Aristotle”) is in each case to 
distinguish the Aristotelian usage from the Stoic sense of the term concerned.40 
Nevertheless it may be urged that there could have been a phrase identical in 
format to the relevant Mantissa titles : “The [views] derived from Aristotle concern-
ing the intellect from without (Τὰ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν) which 
the author of the DI has restructured. So the point is that all of the components of a 
title paralleled in the Mantissa are here. However, the compelling reason for retaining 
the emendation of ST is that the definite relative pronoun ἃ requires a specific ante-
cedent which would be supplied by substantive phrase “<the> [views] on the intellect 
                                       
 37. This argument is anticipated in AD, p. XXVII, n. 27. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
De intellectu 110.4,” p. 255 and n. 21 remark that AD (p. XXVII, n. 77) here reject the emendation advanced 
by ST “partly because of the emendation it involves” : curiously they do not complain of the emendation it-
self, although such a reservation might be seen as advancing their argument. 
 38. Cf. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 256, n. 29. 
 39. Ibid., p. 255-256 ; and Quaestio 2.12 ; and Ethical Problems 7. 
 40. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 254-256. Actually, as they 
(ibid., p. 255) observe, ST do not construe these words as a title. They also argue that the particle γὰρ 
at 110.5 would point back to the noetic argument of the previous section. 
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from without [sc. derived from] Aristotle.”41 We do not need to think of the phrase as 
a title in order to accomplish this argument. 
If then we follow ST at 110.4, then what we have is an announcement of the au-
thor’s subject : “The things in a tradition derived from Aristotle concerning the intel-
lect from without.” If this is the case, then there need be no embarrassment at the re-
prise of “Aristotle” at 110.5 where the author then tells us what were the reasons that 
were said to induce Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without. Accattino refers 
to the Greek produced by the construal of Opsomer and Sharples as a “barbarous ex-
pression” (espressione così barbara) although he does not explain this harsh judg-
ment.42 In any case, the emendation advanced by ST does not present infelicitous 
Greek, if that is the concern, and may on that ground be preferred to the construal by 
Opsomer and Sharples. 
Accattino compares “according to Aristotle” (κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη) for reference to 
the Stagirite at 106.19 : “Intellect, according to Aristotle, is threefold” (νοῦς ἐστι 
κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τριττός) and 113.3 : “If really we must assume that according to 
Aristotle” (εἰ ὅλως ὑπολαμβάνειν χρὴ κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη κτλ.) and wonders why, if 
the author intended to refer to the Stagirite here, he would not use the same formula ? 
The answer to his question is surely that the author intends to relate a tradition that he 
has received concerning why Aristotle introduces the intellect from without and is not 
(as in these passages) proceeding apodictically to explain Aristotle.43 
Accattino divides the argument of the DI as follows : 
A. 106.19-110.3. Alexander expounds his theory in his own person. 
B.1 110.4-25. Alexander recounts a lecture he has heard from Aristotle of 
Mytilene explaining what were the motives that induced Aristotle the Stagirite to in-
troduce the intellect from without. Here Alexander refers to a tradition that must be 
connected to the “Aristotle” of 110.4 (the “were said” [ἐλέγετο] of the following line 
supports the idea that we are speaking of a tradition).44 
B.2. 110.25-112.5. The author advances his own theory about the intellect from 
without. 
                                       
 41. We owe this observation to Schroeder’s colleague Margaret Reesor. W.W. GOODWIN and C.B. GULICK 
(Greek Grammar, Boston, New York, Chicago, London, Atlanta, Dallas, Columbus, San Francisco, Ginn 
and Company, 1930) remark : “The antecedent of a relative may be omitted when it can easily be supplied 
from the context, especially if it is indefinite” (§ 1 026). They remark further (§ 1 027) : “In such cases it is 
a mistake to say that ταῦτα, ἐκεῖνοι, etc. are understood […], The relative clause here really becomes a 
substantive and contains its antecedent within itself.” J. OPSOMER and R. SHARPLES (“Alexander of Aph-
rodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 253) translate DI 110.4-5 : “I also heard about the intellect from without, 
from Aristotle, (things) which I preserved.” This translation obviously does, contrary to the rule set forth 
by Goodwin and Gulick, understand or supply an antecedent pronoun. The relative pronoun here requires a 
specific antecedent as provided by the ST emendation. 
 42. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 13, n. 13. The tone of this criticism reflects that 
of ibid., p. 52, in his critique of SCHROEDER (“The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander 
of Aphrodisias”) and of AD, p. XXVI, n. 76 with respect to ST, p. 19 ff. on Aristotle of Mytilene. We have 
not bothered to reply in kind. 
 43. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 13, n. 13. 
 44. Ibid., p. 12-13. 
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C.1. 112.5-113.12. With the unattributed words “wishing to show that the intel-
lect was immortal…” (βουλόμενος δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον δεικνύναι…) Alexander 
again introduces the voice of Aristotle of Mytilene who offers a Stoicizing view of 
the ubiquity of the intellect from without. 
C.2. 113.12-24. Alexander offers an alternative interpretation to the ubiquity of 
the intellect from without in which he rejects the views of Aristotle of Mytilene. 
There are two approaches to the problems of the DI. One belongs to textual 
recension, the other to prosopography. We may begin with textual recension. To take 
Aristotle of Mytilene as the referent of “Aristotle” (Ἀριστοτέλους) provides a con-
venient solution for the crux at 110.4. Accattino is then able to see Aristotle of 
Mytilene as the referent of “wishing” (βουλόμενος) at 112.5, so that we need not 
suppose a lacuna at this point in the MS.45 
If we approach these questions from the horizon of prosopography, however, a 
different picture emerges. The onus of proof is always on the scholar who advances a 
prosopographical identification. For the purposes of prosopography the evidence 
seems insufficient. The fact that Aristotle of Mytilene provides a neat solution to the 
crux does not of itself prove that he is the referent of the “Aristotle” at 110.4. If we 
approach the passage as first readers, a reference to “Aristotle” would surely cause us 
to identify the referent as the Aristotle, i.e., the Stagirite. Accattino attempts to solve 
this difficulty by supposing that the DI is a kind of personal memorandum that the 
young Alexander of Aphrodisias composed as a summary of his noetic education. 
Thus the reference to “Aristotle” at 110.4 would be known to himself as Aristotle of 
Mytilene. Since there was no intended reader, there was no reason to explain the ref-
erence to his audience (that consisted only of himself). The same is true of the refer-
ent of βουλόμενος κτλ. at 112.5.46 Accattino’s hypothesis that the DI is a document 
from the Nachlass of the young Alexander is indeed difficult to believe. 
In ST we argue that it is most unlikely that the DI would belong to the youth of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. Where we would agree with Accattino is that it does read 
very much like a set of notes. It also presents a very wooden and serial account of the 
threefold structure of intellect in Part A. The three phases of intellect it describes re-
spond to the stages of intellect in Alexander’s DA. Yet this account is very different 
from the dynamic developmental account of the growth of intellect in Alexander’s 
DA. It is far more likely that such an account of intellect, which reads like a set of 
notes, is itself dependent upon Alexander’s DA than that it would precede the DA.47 If 
the DI is not to be relegated to the juvenilia of Alexander, then it is unlikely that the 
work is by him at all. If we are right that there are serious concerns about the author-
ship of the DI, then we must call into doubt that the “Aristotle” of 110.4 is the teacher 
                                       
 45. Suggested by P. MORAUX, Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Exégète de la noétique d’Aristote, p. 148-149 ; cf. ST, 
p. 23, 72-73. 
 46. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 13-15. 
 47. ST, p. 19-22. 
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of Alexander’s youth. This scruple casts a shadow on the whole prosopographical ex-
ercise of Moraux and Accattino. 
Sharples, in the Introduction to his translation of the Mantissa, accepts Accat-
tino’s argument that the DI “is an early work of Alexander.”48 In his commentary on 
the crux at 110.4, he persists in advancing the argument suggested by Opsomer : “I 
also heard, about the intellect from without from Aristotle, [things] which I pre-
served.”49 Sharples comments : “If it instead is translated ‘I also heard from Aristotle 
things about the intellect from without, which I preserved’, the reference will proba-
bly be to Aristoteles of Mytilene.”50 
Now Accattino’s argument for classifying the DI as an early work of Alexander 
depends upon his prosopographical identification of the “Aristotle” of 110.4 with 
Aristotle of Mytilene. It is therefore surprising that Sharples, who adopts Opsomer’s 
translation, which excludes reference to Aristotle of Mytilene, would find that “Ac-
cattino […] persuasively argues that […] On Intellect […] is an early work of Alex-
ander.”51 In another and later paper, Sharples also expresses agreement with Accat-
tino’s argument52 that the DI is a work of Alexander’s youth.53 
Subsequently Sharples expresses agreement with ST that we cannot know who is 
the author of the views expressed at C.1 and that the reference at 110.1 is to Aristotle 
the Stagirite. He also expresses the view that we cannot be sure that “the de Intellectu 
is a work by Alexander himself or from his time.”54 Here is a further consideration : 
At 110.5-6 Alexander says that “these were the considerations were said to have 
(ταῦτα ἐλέγετο εἶναι) motivated Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without.” If 
Alexander is referring to his master Aristotle of Mytilene, why does he use a passive 
construction ? Surely a passive construction would better reflect views in general (as 
on the thesis of ST) about the intellect from without. On the other hand, Accattino 
seems to suggest that Aristotle of Mytilene might himself be relating a tradition con-
cerning the motives that induced Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without : “In 
the first part of B Alexander makes reference to a tradition that should be connected 
to the Aristotle of 110.4 (cf. the following γὰρ [‘for’] and ἐλέγετο [‘were said’]”).55 
Now, instead of having the views of Aristotle of Mytilene himself on the intellect 
                                       
 48. R.W. SHARPLES, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Supplement to “On the Soul,” p. 2. 
 49. Ibid., p. 32. 
 50. Ibid., p. 32, n. 71. 
 51. Ibid., p. 2. 
 52. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, especially p. 14-15. 
 53. R.W. SHARPLES, “Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ,” in G. MOVIA, ed. Temi metafisici e 
problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi, Collana fondata da Giovanni Reale e diretta da Roberta Radice, 
94, Milan, Largo A. Gemelli, 2003, p. 193, n. 32. He also finds support for this view in M. RASHED, “A 
‘new’ text of Alexander on the soul’s motion,” in R. SORABJI, ed., Aristotle and After. London (coll. “Bul-
letin of the Institute of Classical Studies,” suppl. vol. 68), 1997, p. 181-195 ; reprinted in M. RASHED, 
L’héritage aristotélicien : textes inédits de l’Antiquité, Paris, 2007, p. 143-157 (see n. 57 below). 
 54. He also argues against AD, p. XXVII, n. 77, whom he sees as rejecting ST on the grounds that there argu-
ment requires emendation, that the same result as ST offer may be achieved by the construal offered by 
OPSOMER and SHARPLES (“Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4”). 
 55. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 12-13. 
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from without, we have a tradition that he is reporting to us. We have to wait until the 
βουλόμενος of 112.5, itself a very insecure reference to Aristotle of Mytilene, for the 
views of Aristotle of Mytilene himself. 
What is more, Accattino does not detect a great difference in doctrine between 
the tradition reported from 110.4-112.25 (B.1) and the personal views of Alexander 
at 110.25-112.5 (B.2).56 If both B.1 and B.2 were the views of Aristotle of Mytilene, 
it would seem surprising that Aristotle of Mytilene could be the author of C.1 which 
is at variance with the account of the intellect from without in B. By having Aristotle 
of Mytilene in B.1 report a tradition about what motivated Aristotle to introduce the 
intellect from without, instead of expressing his own views, he is still able to express 
in his own voice a view that is at variance with that tradition. Of course, Alexander 
can present his own views in B.2 and these views, as they belong to Alexander and 
not to the author of C.1, can differ from the views expressed in C.1. Is it not in the 
end more economical to suppose that the material in B.1 expresses an anonymous 
tradition than to have to ascribe that tradition to Aristotle of Mytilene in order to 
avoid a contradiction with C.1 ?57 
                                       
 56. Ibid., p. 11. 
 57. M. RASHED (“A ‘new’ text of Alexander on the soul’s motion,” p. 192, n. 28 ; reprint, p. 154, n. 28) argues 
against ST that the use of the first person at 110.4 is not of itself an argument for the independence of B 
from C.1 and C.2 and stresses that the first person occurs at 113.12 (ἐδόκει μοι). He omits to mention that 
ST argue that, in the rare instances of the first person in Alexander and Themistius (ST, p. 30), it introduces 
a text. It is the introductory character of the first person that persuades us that a new text is beginning 
at 110.4. The use of the first person at 113.12 need not be a resumption of the first person of 110.4. It could 
simply mean that the author of the material that follows is criticizing the views expressed following the un-
attributed participle “wishing” βουλόμενος at 112.5. Admittedly the common use of the rare first person at 
both 110.4 and 113.12 itself might cause us to think that the author of both passages is the same. Yet the 
second use of the first person has not the strong introductory character of its use at 110.4. Whether or not 
we wish to accept Rashed’s views of the authenticity of the DI as a work of Alexander will depend on 
whether we agree with the elaborate source criticism by which he establishes reference in C.1 to Atticus of 
the view that the intellect from without is to be defended by claiming its ubiquity, a view criticized in C.2 
in terms of thought processes. Rashed is, in any case, left with two possibilities for the referent of “wish-
ing” (βουλόμενος) at 112.5 : (1) either Aristotle of Mytilene ; or (2) an associate of Alexander is modelling 
his critique of the author of the views expressed in C.1 on Alexander’s attack on Atticus (p. 194 ; reprint, 
p. 156). The first solution lands us in the same problems we have already confronted with that construal. 
The second demands that we extend an already complicated vein of source criticism to a putative author 
who shares the views of Atticus. Rashed argues that a fragment of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics vi.4 (Parisinius suppl. gr. 643, 101r and ap. Simpl. in Phys. 964.9-23) betrays close lexical re-
semblance to DI C.1 and C.2. In the commentary on the Physics Alexander argues against the separation of 
soul and body on the grounds that something partless cannot move. In the DI C.1 the intellect in motion is 
avoided by making the intellect present everywhere in the universe. In C.2 intellect is present or not ac-
cording to whether it is made the object of thought. The neglect of the argument concerning partlessness in 
the commentary on the Physics and C.2’s emphasis on being in place instead of moving is a sign of lesser 
sophistication on the part of C.2. Therefore C.2 is to be dated before the commentary on the Physics. If this 
is so, then SCHROEDER (“The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias”) is 
wrong in assigning a much later date to the DI (R.W. SHARPLES, “Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle,” in 
Dorothea FREDE, André LAK, ed., Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology. Its Background 
and Aftermath, Leiden, Boston, Cologne, Brill [coll. “Philosophia Antiqua,” 89], 2002, p. 29, n. 132, en-
tertains this possibility). Yet, as Rashed observes (p. 194 ; reprint, p. 156), this difference could be ex-
plained by the author’s adherence to the context of the exposition in C.1 (which Rashed thinks is authored 
by Aristotle of Mytilene). 
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The DI has certainly spawned some wonderfully imaginative prosopography. 
And prosopography can be a most seductive muse. We have gone from identifying an 
Aristocles of Messene (with a whole new philosophy to go along with him) to Aris-
totle of Mytilene (and a whole chapter on the noetic of Aristotle of Mytilene in 
Moraux to go along with him). We should perhaps be wary of these projects. The ap-
proach of ST is quite willing to accept the fragmentary and adventitious character of 
the material in the DI and perhaps this is a better avenue than that of prosopographi-
cal ambition. We do not really know if the Aristotle of 110.4 is the Aristotle of 
Mytilene identified by Galen. The argument is circular. All we know of Aristotle of 
Mytilene is that he was a Peripatetic. We have no philosophical views imparted by 
him other than those putatively assembled by Moraux on the conjecture that the ref-
erence at 110.4 is to Aristotle of Mytilene. We also do not know if Aristotle of 
Mytilene is to be identified with the “our Aristotle” of the commentary on the Meta-
physics. All that we can say with assurance is that Alexander might have had a 
teacher of the name of Aristotle and that that Aristotle might be the referent of 110.4. 
It is doubtless better to advance an analytic interpretation that questions both the 
unity and the authorship of the DI than to opt for a unitarian view that must accom-
modate its problems with circular prosopographical argument. 
